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Abstract:
Compared to big states, small states face resource-related disadvantages in European 
negotiations. They have fewer votes, less economic power, fewer administrative 
resources and less staff and experts in policy fields. This leads to disadvantages in 
negotiations. Yet small states can concentrate their limited resources on issues of 
great importance and can punch above their weight. This is especially effective 
through argumentative instead of bargaining-based strategies and requires that 
arguments resonate well with the views of the Council, the Presidency, the 
Commission or the Parliament. The Vodka-case illustrates how small states applied a 
broad variety of policy-shaping strategies and achieved a compromise outcome very 
close to their wishes and far away from the Commission’s policy proposal, although 
the UK-led oppositional coalition had more bargaining leverage than the Vodka-
purists.
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I. Introduction
While we know much about the negotiation behaviour and successes of big states, 
small states are less often at the centre of attention. Therefore, this paper analyses the 
following research question: how and under which conditions do small states punch 
above their weight and influence EU policy outcomes?
The policy interests of big states are often accommodated during the final 
stages of Council negotiations, even if a minimal winning coalition could do without 
them (Thompson and Hosli 2006). Accordingly, states with fewer votes face 
structural disadvantages in EU negotiations because they cannot rely on the shadow of 
their voting power to influence the content of European directives or regulations. In 
addition, small states tend to have slimmer administrations and have consequently 
fewer personnel and financial and administrative resources available than big member 
states to swiftly prepare instructions that are well-supported by expertise. As a 
consequence, small states have more difficulties in successfully using argumentative 
and bargaining-based shaping activities. Nevertheless, they are not inactive, but seek 
to redirect their limited capacities to the most important issues (e.g. Laffan 2006, 
interview Permanent Representation#12, 07-07-08) and to engage in a broad variety 
of negotiation strategies in such negotiations (e.g. interview Permanent 
Representation#15, 15-07-08). The Vodka-case2 is an instance of a high-priority 
negotiation for the Nordic and Baltic states as well as Poland and the UK and is a 
good case study to analyse how small states try to punch above their weight and under 
which conditions different strategies are effective. 
In December 2005, the European Commission proposed to revise the 
regulation on spirit drinks from 1989. In this dossier, the Commission introduced a 
distinction of three different types of spirit drinks, developed definitions of those 
drinks, made rules for their presentation and labelling and proposed the protection of 
geographical indications. The most controversial was the part on Vodka. The 
European Commission defined Vodka as a "spirit drink produced of ethyl alcohol of 
agricultural origin" (Commission of the European Communities 2005b: 29) and 
proposed that the raw materials used to produce Vodka should be printed on the label 
(Commission of the European Communities 2005b: 29,d). Very quickly, Poland as 
2 Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 on 
the definition, description, presentation, labeling and the protection of geographical indications of spirit 
drinks and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 1576/89,  OJ L 39, 13.2.2008, p. 16–54.
well as the three Baltic states, Sweden, Finland and Denmark voiced their 
disagreement. Poland and the others argued that that “true vodka could only be made 
from potatoes or cereals” (Mercer 2006a). The UK and some Southern European 
countries, however, opposed this narrow definition of Vodka (Mercer 2006a). The UK 
is the second largest Vodka producer after Russia (BBC News 2007) and 
approximately 25-30% of Scottish Vodka is produced out of beets (European 
Communities 2006). Hungary, Bulgaria and Cyprus are not big producers, but were 
recently producing Vodka out of wine grapes and other fruit (Mercer 2006a). Hence, 
if the vodka purists would manage to shape the spirit drink regulation fully in 
accordance with their interests, the UK and all other countries that use raw materials 
other than cereals or potatoes for the distillation could no longer sell their products as 
"Vodka". 
The following section introduces an array of negotiation strategies and 
theorises under which conditions they are potentially successful (II). This reveals that 
some strategies (e.g. bargaining) are indeed more effective for bigger than for smaller 
member states, while others (e.g. arguing) require scope conditions other than size to 
be successful. Furthermore, the latter offers an opportunity for small states to 
eventually punch above their weight. The developed hypotheses are then put to an 
empirical test (III). This shows that small states are indeed very active for issues of 
great importance and – as expected – successful via arguing-based strategies when 
their arguments resonate well with prior beliefs of the addressees (IV). Not all applied 
strategies worked out well for both sides if the necessary scope conditions were 
absent. While the UK and Poland as big states used bargaining-based strategies, they 
did so unsuccessfully because their threats lacked force since the addressees did not 
believe in interferences with their own action plans. Arguments in the Council were 
likewise unsuccessful. Hence, lobbying the Commission, the Presidency and the 
European Parliament (EP) became crucial. In this regard, small states were successful. 
Most notable, the small states on the purist-side effectively worked through an EP 
committee and with contacts with the German Presidency and finally achieved a 
compromise outcome very close to their ideal point, although the UK-led opposition 
coalition had more bargaining leverage than the purists.   
II. Theorizing Shaping Strategies 
Negotiation research has shown that states usually apply many strategies at a time to 
influence policy outcomes. For example, arguing and bargaining usually coexists 
(Risse 2000), states often engage in coalition building, and if issues are very 
important they frequently tend to contact the European Commission, the Presidency, 
and the European Parliament. There are differences in the overall activity pattern 
between the states. For example,  Denmark and Sweden tend to be considerable more 
active than the Baltic states (Panke 2008b). Yet, the application of shaping strategies 
is not the same as success, but merely its very precondition (interviews Permanent 
Representation#43, 13-01-09, Permanent Representation#49, 12-02-09). Therefore, 
this section theorizes under which scope conditions the different strategies are 
effective. 
Arguments (claims that  give reasons related to the intersubjective world) and 
bargaining acts  (threats, demands and concessions that might be supported by reasons 
related to the subjective world, c.f. Panke 2009 forthcoming) coexist in international 
interactions and facilitate a debate on contextual conditions conducive to either 
arguing or bargaining. A substantive body of research tackled the question of under 
which conditions arguing is effective (Risse 2000). Some approaches inquired 
whether contexts facilitate the recurrence of communicative action (Elgström 2000, 
Müller 1995). Others focus on the scope conditions under which arguments make a 
difference. They deduce scope conditions from the Habermasian discourse theory, 
which is concerned with proper decision-making procedures for modern societies 
which allow for deliberation and, thus, for legitimate outcomes (Habermas 1983). 
Accordingly, high norm density and high institutionalization approximate a common 
life world which, in turn, serves as a presupposition to successful communicative 
action and effective arguing (Deitelhoff and Müller 2005). Yet, these approaches 
assume that contextual variables encourage more argumentative speech acts, which is 
presumed to automatically translate into persuasion. Even though the institutional 
context remains constant, some arguments cannot influence a policy outcome while 
others are persuasive. We will see this in the Vodka case. Hence, even though 
interactions create opportunities for persuasion by increasing the flow of ideas, the 
making of an argument alone is not sufficient to persuade addressees. Therefore, it is 
crucial to inquire into the quality of arguments. What makes an argument compelling? 
Simply put, the answer is that good arguments have to resonate with the addressee’s 
prior scientific, normative or value-based beliefs to be regarded as persuasive 
(Habermas 1995a, Habermas 1995b). This requires a speaker to frame an argument in 
a manner that the addressees’ regard as compelling based on their cognitive 
predispositions (on truth, normative or value related matters or based on the good 
reputation of the speaker, c.f. Panke 2005). 
This leads to the following hypothesis: The more the arguments resonate with 
the prior beliefs of addresses, the more effective they will be in influencing the 
positions of others (H 1). 
Bargaining is also prominent in EU negotiations (Bailer 2004, Thompson and Hosli 
2006). But again, making an explicit or implicit threat (e.g., with a ‘no’ vote in the 
Council), voicing a demand, or offering a compromise is not sufficient to get 
concessions. Similar to arguing, bargaining can only be effective if the speaker frames 
the bargaining act in a manner that resonates well with prior factual beliefs of the 
audience (e.g. Panke 2005). For example, if a state makes a particular demand with 
reference to domestic veto players, who would never accept any other outcome, the 
bargaining act will only be effective if the addressees know that domestic veto players 
are present.  The addresses must also believe that the domestic veto players are ready 
to do harm by advocating a position contrary to their own.  When the speaker realizes 
the threat, he will pull out. While the first parts require shared knowledge about what 
constitutes bargaining power in a particular context, the second requires that the 
addressees believe that threat will be carried out and negatively impact their self-
interests. 
We can, thus, hypothesize that bargaining acts need to be based on a shared 
conception of what constitutes bargaining power in a particular context and are  more 
effective when the addressees believe that the explicit or implicit threat will be carried 
out and will interfere with their own action plans (H 2).
Next to arguing and bargaining in working groups, COREPER and ministerial levels 
of the Council of Ministers, states also engage in corridor-based strategies. These 
include coalition building and contacting the Commission, the European Parliament 
and the Presidency. 
Coalition-building can serve different purposes: creating a minimal winning 
coalition or a blocking minority as well as increasing the bargaining leverage to push 
forward selected points vis-à-vis third parties (Elgstöm et al. 2001 , Kaeding and 
Seleck 2005). In order to create coalitions, the initiator either approaches like-minded 
states or seeks to attract neutral ones. The former is more likely successful if a 
common denominator is present or if the coalition-builder can offer side-payments or 
issue linkages in exchange for getting additional self-interested states on their own 
side. The latter is more likely successful if the initiator can evoke solidarity norms or 
norms of diffuse reciprocity. Yet, coalitions can only effectively shape negotiation 
outcomes if their internal coherence is sufficiently high to have a common position 
and if they created a critical mass (e.g. a blocking minority requires a lowest common 
denominator preference, a winning coalition requires a common goal). Hence, we can 
develop two hypotheses; The stronger the similarity of preferences over outcomes 
among the partners and the greater the added power of all coalition partners, the more 
successful the minimal winning coalitions (H3a). Similarly, the greater the coherency 
of the minimum acceptable outcomes among the partners and the higher their 
collective leverage, the more successful are blocking minority coalitions (H3b).
Contacts to the European Commission can serve several purposes because the 
Commission not only develops the policy proposal, but also participates in Council 
negotiations where it has a voice but no vote. In approaching the Commission, states 
can seek to influence the content of their policy proposal in the first place, draw on 
the Commission’s expertise, or influence the Commission to use its institutional 
authority to support a state’s concerns during negotiations (interview Permanent 
Representation#3, 10-04-08). To influence the Commission, good arguments are 
crucial (Bunse, Magnette and Nicolaidis 2005, Panke 2008a, interview Permanent 
Representation#9, 29-05-08). Hence, we can hypothesize that contacts to the 
Commission are the more successful to gain influence over outcomes, the better a 
state’s arguments resonate with Commission priorities and believes (H4). 
Working through the European Parliament is another means to influence 
policies that are decided via the co-decision procedure, which gives the Council and 
the Parliament equal weight. Contacts to a country’s Members of the EP (MEPs) can 
be influential if the arguments fed into the Parliament resonate well, which is 
especially likely if the MEPs are members of the committee dealing with the subject 
matter. In addition, contacts to the rapporteur or the shadow rapporteur of the relevant 
committee are very important to diffuse ideas and proposals (interview Permanent 
Representation#49, 12-02-09). Thus, contacts to the Parliament are more likely to 
successfully shaping policies that are decided via co-decision if the approached MEPs 
are members of the committee dealing with the issue, especially if they are 
rapporteurs or shadow rapporteurs (H 5).
Since the Presidency chairs the meetings, prepares the minutes, and drafts 
proposals, this office can influence outcomes as well (Elgström 2003). Hence, 
lobbying the Presidency is also a strategy used to shape European polices. States can 
approach the presidency with arguments or bargaining acts. This requires that 
arguments resonate well or that a mutual perception of what constitutes bargaining 
power and a credible threat are present. Yet, since the office of the Presidency is 
linked to a norm of neutrality (Bengtsson, Elgström and Tallberg 2004: 319, interview 
Permanent Representation#13, 07-07-08), its responsiveness to arguments and 
bargaining threats declines, the stronger and the more obvious the self-interests own 
of the state holding the Presidency are (interview Permanent Representation#57, 19-
03-09). Thus, this hypothesis states: Shaping outcomes via contacts to the Presidency 
is the more likely, the better the arguments resonate or the more credible explicit or 
implicit bargaining threats are, if the Presidency is not obviously self-interested in the 
same way as the approaching state (H 6). 
The next section tests the hypotheses in the negotiations of the sprit drinks regulation. 
It inquires which conditions small states can shape outcomes despite the structural 
disadvantages they face and when they are doomed to fail. Testing negotiation 
hypotheses faces the methodological difficulty that the success of shaping attempts 
does not only depend on a single strategy and the presence of the enabling scope 
conditions, but also on the distribution of preferences and votes in the broader 
context. In the end, effective influence on the content of policy outcomes is not 
determined by the success of a single strategy vis-à-vis its target, but also dependent 
upon whether enough actors are convinced of a particular position or prepared either 
to compromise from a minimal winning coalition or to create a blocking minority. In 
order to tackle this challenge, the next section applies process-tracing and analyses the 
failures and effectiveness of individual strategies. In addition, states with the 
necessary resources usually apply more than one strategy for issues of high priority. 
Consequently, the extent to which a state has success in negotiations is based on the 
aggregate of these strategies. 
III. Successes and Failures of Small States in the Vodka Case
Given the large size of the spirit drinks industry in the Vodka-production countries 
(interview organised interests#1, 02-04-09), the stakes were high on both sides and all 
countries involved had strong incentives to invest their resources in shaping strategies 
(interview PM office#1, 18-02-09). These included contacting the Commission, the 
Presidency, and the EP, engaging in coalition building; and arguing and bargaining. 
The negotiations lasted from December 2005 until December 2007 and discussions on 
raw materials for Vodka were intense. Accordingly, the Council working parties met 
approximately once a week. Despite the issue being framed as an agricultural rather 
than a trade matter, it was decided under co-decision procedure. The European 
Parliament had its first and only reading in June 2007 and opted for a compromise 
that called for the labelling of the ingredients of the Vodka for sale (e.g., “Vodka 
made of”), if it was not distilled from  potato or cereals (European Parliament 2007). 
The Council met six months later, and approved the compromise against two negative 
votes and one abstention (Council of the European Union 2007). 
The initial distribution of preferences was the following: The UK as the 
second largest Vodka producer in the world was in favour of a broad definition, 
because 25-30% of the Scottish Vodka production uses beets and not cereals or 
potatoes (European Communities 2006). Hungary, Bulgaria and Cyprus have much 
smaller Vodka industries that mostly rely on grapes. Not surprisingly, they also 
preferred a broad definition of the spirit drink sold under the label of “Vodka”. On the 
other side were the “Vodka purists” that only use cereals and potatoes in Vodka 
distillation: Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden and Finland. All other states 
had minor or no self-interest in Vodka, but were more concerned with other elements 
of the spirit drink regulation (e.g. Austria’s Hüttentee, the Czech Slivovitz, or the 
French cognac, interview Permanent Representation#43, 13-01-09). Four states then 
were trying to keep a broad definition and were opposed by six states who wanted to 
narrow the Commission’s proposal to cereals and potatoes only. The outcome was a 
compromise, but one which did not favour two states, Poland and Lithuania. Sweden 
also voted ‘no’, but did so not because they could not accept the compromise, but 
because of a translation error in the final version of the regulation in relation to 
brannvin which could have affected their internal spirit drink market (interview 
Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-09).   
How did the states get from the Commission’s initial very broad definition of 
Vodka, according to which it is a spirit drink made of agricultural raw materials, to 
the considerably more specific definition of Vodka (i.e., Vodka is “Vodka” if it is 
produced out of potatoes and cereals and labelled “Vodka made of …” if it is 
produced with other agricultural raw materials)? Which strategies had been successful 
and which ones failed? To what extent had small states been active in the 
negotiations, which strategies did they apply and when were they effective?
Arguing (H1)
Arguments between the states were exchanged in each and every working group 
meeting. But not all arguments equally resonated with the audience of neutral states. 
Poland, Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania argued that Vodka 
production and consumption had a long tradition in their countries and is part of their 
culture (interviews PM Office #1, 18-02-09, Permanent Representation#42, 12-01-09, 
Permanent Representation #56, 19-03-09, European Voice 2006). As such, it should 
be protected by the European Union though a definition that does not allow selling 
spirit drinks produced of raw materials other than potatoes or cereals under the label 
“Vodka”. Yet, this argument was instantly challenged by the proponents of a broader 
definition. The UK extensively drew on arguments of a UK-based interest group, the 
European Vodka Alliance (EVA), and argued, “our point was that Britain had been 
making vodka for long enough, longer than, for example, Sweden” (interview EP#2, 
02-04-09).3 In addition, they emphasized that “northern European countries have 
sometimes also used other ingredients than grain and potatoes. Vodka has been made 
out of sugar beet or swede in Poland, the alliance says, and Swedish brannvin was 
sometimes made out of a waste product of the paper industry ” (BBC News 2006). On 
balance, the tradition argument was only valid for some of the “Vodka-belt” countries 
and did not persuade neutral countries to support them (interview Permanent 
Representation#56, 19-03-09).
3 Similarly, the EVA spokesperson Scott-Wilson stated that “tradition could play very little part 
considering Sweden only launched its first 'vodka' product in 1958, and Finland in 1965.”(Mercer 
2006a).
Sweden and organised interests from Poland made an analogy between Vodka 
and Whiskey, arguing that both are culturally embedded spirit drinks, but the 
definition of the latter is much more specified than the former (interviews Permanent 
Representation#60, 30-03-09, organized interests#2, 02-04-09). In line with this, a 
Finnish MEP stated “Scotch whisky has a very strict definition - it can only be made 
out of grain and malted grain - and my argument is that we need equality. Vodka 
needs to be defined much like whisky.” (A Stubb cited in BBC News 2006). 
However, the Scottish Deputy Enterprise Minister argued that “the difference between 
the two drinks was that you could taste the raw materials in whisky, but not in vodka.” 
(Wilson cited in BBC News 2006). 
This then shifted the debate to a question of taste. Poland, which was very 
active and constantly took the floor, claimed that the taste of Vodka produced of 
cereals and potatoes is special and not identical with Vodka made from grapes or 
molasses (interview Ministry of Agriculture#2, 30-03-09, interview Permanent 
Representation#60, 30-03-09). It was essential, therefore, to limit the raw materials 
only to cereals and potatoes. In order to underline this point, the Polish delegation 
organised Vodka tastings in the corridors (interview Permanent Representation#54, 
18-03-09). Yet, this did not convince many delegations: “you had all these panels 
tasting vodka, trying to find out the difference and I mean at every meeting we went 
to there would be somebody with bottles of vodka saying ‘try this, taste that, do this 
and see they are so different’ and we would just be going ‘this one did not taste that 
good, neither did this one’. Sort of ‘where is the umbrella and the pineapple to go with 
it?’” (interview Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-09). The UK together with the 
EVA reacted to this tasting  practices in underlying its claim that “most of the taste 
from the raw materials is lost during vodka distillation” (Mercer 2006a). Neither the 
UK argument nor the Polish one induced position shifts of neutral states (e.g. 
interview Permanent Representation#56, 19-03-09, interview Permanent 
Representation#60, 30-03-09). Even a Finnish MEP who stated early in the discussion 
that “Vodka made of ingredients other than potato and grain tasted "very different"” 
(Alex Stubb quoted in BBC News 2006) modified his argument in later stages of the 
debate and emphasized that a narrow definition is necessary to protect the quality of 
the product:4 “I don't want vodka to be a product which can be made of all 
agricultural products, which basically means you can use it to wash your windows.” 
(Alex Stubb quoted in Kroegger 2007). This brought the debate back to square one. 
While some delegations conceded that “only a very small percentage of people can 
actually taste the difference” (interview Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-09), 
others remained neutral and did not react to the Whiskey-analogy (e.g. interview 
Permanent Representation#56, 19-03-09). 
In sum, none of the arguments resonated reasonably well with the audience in Council 
negotiations. As expected by the arguing-hypothesis, persuasion did not pull neutral 
states in either direction (e.g. interview Permanent Representation#56, 19-03-09, 
interview Ministry of Agriculture#2, 03-04-09).
Bargaining (H2)
Bargaining was important during the negotiations as well, not the least since the 
Vodka-issue was highly politicized. 
Even though opposed by the UK, the Polish and Swedish demanded to restrict Vodka 
to cereals and potatoes as raw materials. The Scottish Deputy Enterprise Minister 
regarded this as a “commercial attack on the UK white spirits industry” (Allan Wilson 
in  BBC News 2006). Due to the limited individual and collective bargaining leverage 
of those states, the UK did not meet this threat with concessions. Instead, they voiced 
a threat themselves, flagging that “such restrictions could also land the Commission 
with another battle at the World Trade Organisation” (Mercer 2006a). This was 
backed up by South-Africa, a former British colony, which emphasised that a narrow 
definition of Vodka creates obstacles to free trade and would have to be dealt with by 
the WTO (interview Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-09, Mercer 2006b). This 
threat was not credible for the opponents, who believed that there were no legal 
problems involved and did not trigger concessions (interview Permanent 
Representation#60, 30-03-09). Likewise, the neutral states did not react. They did not 
regard the WTO as a bargaining-chip because a dispute settlement procedure in front 
4 “Even Finnish MEP and vodka traditionalist Alexander Stubb admits it can be difficult to guess 
which vodka is made from what raw materials in a blind tasting. But he argues it is about quality.” 
(Kroegger 2007).
of the WTO and a negative outcome with sanctions would not have harmed their spirit 
drink industries (interview Ministry of Agriculture#3, 03-04-09).  
Poland adapted its tactics in the negotiations and played ‘hard ball’ (interview 
Permanent Representation#61, 02-04-09, interview organised interests#1, 02-04-09).  
They made it clear that they would vote against the regulation if their interests would 
not be accommodated (interview Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-09, interview 
Permanent Representation#61, 02-04-09). Poland also emphasized that “during most 
of the negotiations time, countries which wanted a more narrow definition of vodka 
had a blocking minority” (interview Ministry of Agriculture#2, 30-03-09 referring to 
PL, SE, FI, DK, EE, LT, LV, SI) and that they wanted “to call attention to the 
importance of proper definition of vodka” (interview Ministry of Agriculture#2, 30-
03-09). While it was never contested that the shadow of votes constitutes an essential 
element of bargaining power, the effect of a potential Polish negative vote was very 
limited in the Council because this alone was not sufficient to block the regulation. 
The blocking minority would have been a different story. However, countries such as 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark, were not prepared to block the regulation and did not 
voice such a threat in the end (e.g. interviews Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-
09, Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-09, Permanent Representation#42, 12-01-
09). Furthermore, the Polish threat of hinting at a unified blocking minority was not 
credible and did not trigger concessions.5
The UK pulled all strings as well. They emphasised vis-à-vis Poland, Sweden, 
Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that a ‘no’ outcome of the negotiations would 
leave these countries worse off since the status quo would be continued and Vodka 
would not be defined at all (interview Permanent Representation#61, 02-04-09). In 
this sense, the UK counteracted the Polish threat and thereby pushed Estonia and 
Latvia towards making concessions and accepting compromises (similar to Sweden 
and Finland).6
5 Several interviewees argued that Poland harmed itself with these hard ball tactics, since it signalled 
their unwillingness to make concessions, to which other member states reacted in no longer negotiating 
for compromises with Poland (interview Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-09). Instead of 
triggering positive responses, Poland was regarded as being“(..) way beyond any kind of reasonable.” 
and  “(..) in the end they were isolated” (both quotes interview Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-
09). 
6 In addition, Poland, the UK and Sweden offered side-payments to formerly neutral countries in 
exchange for support in the Council (interviews organised interests#1, 02-04-09, Permanent 
Representation#60, 30-03-09). 
In sum, while Poland issued the threat of a ‘no’ vote on several occasions, it was – in 
line with the hypothesis – not successful because it did not negatively interfere with 
the majority of the Council members. Also, since Poland made clear that their 
position was not open for compromises, concessions were not offered to bring them 
into the boat (interview Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-09). At the same time, 
the UK flagged that any outcome would leave the Vodka producers better off than the 
status quo of EU legislation. This could have been interpreted by some as a subtle hint 
towards the blocking minority of a UK-led coalition (interview Permanent 
Representation#61, 02-04-09), but emphasized at the same time that there were 
common interests of Vodka producing countries and that the UK was willing to 
compromise in order to upgrade common interests.
Coalitions (H3a, H3b)
The UK supported by Hungary, Cyprus and Bulgaria initially opted for a definition of 
Vodka that allows for using molasses and grapes as raw materials. Other wine 
producing countries sympathised with them, simply to have an alternative to 
producing wine from grapes (interview Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-09). In 
addition, the European Vodka market was regarded to have a potential for growth and 
was, therefore, attractive to non-traditional Vodka producers, especially since the 
European wine market faced increased competition form non-European wine 
producers (interview Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-09). Poland as well as the 
Baltic states, Sweden and Finland had commercial interests at stake: If Vodka can 
only be produced out of potatoes and cereal, competition is less fierce and the 
potential wins are greater. Against this background, a Finnish MEP stated: “This is a 
battle of the vodka belt against the wine belt, and in between lies the beer belt, which 
will get to decide” (L. Lehtinen cited in BBC News 2007).
The Vodka-purists, namely Poland, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia got support from Denmark which did not have too much at stake, but was 
willing to help Sweden out of solidarity (interview Permanent Representation#54, 18-
03-09). This somewhat increased the collective leverage of the “Vodka-belt” whose 
common ideal outcome was a narrow Vodka-definition based on potatoes and cereals 
only, but which lacked a lowest common denominator preference. Most states were 
willing to accept compromises other than the ‘potatoes and cereals-only’ outcome, but 
Poland and Lithuania had red lines that were identical with the ideal outcome. As a 
consequence, the Vodka-purist coalition (even if it would have increased in size) 
never had a chance to operate as a blocking minority, since the states had different 
ideas of minimum acceptable outcomes. This severely weakened the coalition 
(interviews Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-09, Permanent Representation#54, 
18-03-09).7
The “wine-belt” coalition started off with only four countries (the UK, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Cyprus) that did produce Vodka out of beet, molasses, 
sugarcane or grapes instead of cereals and potatoes only. The UK as the coalition 
leader was very successful to gather additional supporters in the course of 
negotiations (interview Permanent Representation#61, 02-04-09). Through 
“payments” in the form of support on other issues, the Netherlands, the Czech 
Republic France, and Ireland supported the British claim for a broader Vodka-
definition (interview Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-09). However, the internal 
coherence of the coalition was not very high in regard to a common goal (in which 
raw materials should be allowed) while the partners shared a notion of which outcome 
would not be acceptable (potatoes and cereals only). The UK’s primary interest was to 
include sugar beet as a raw material for the Vodka production, while France, Hungary 
and Bulgaria primarily wanted to include grapes, sugar-cane and to some extent citrus 
fruits (interview Ministry of Agriculture#3, 03-04-09). 
At the beginning of negotiations, the Vodka-belt coalition (66 out of 345 
votes) was stronger in size than the Wine-belt coalition (55 out of 345 votes). While 
the former did not gain additional supporters and de facto lost Finland (59 votes), the 
latter gained additional 61 votes and had a combined leverage of 120 votes. Hence, 
neither side achieved a qualified majority, but the UK and its allies had a blocking 
minority to prevent a narrow definition of Vodka allowing for potatoes and cereals as 
raw materials. While, the UK-led coalition had the potential to successfully cast a 
shadow of a blocking minority over the negations, the Vodka-purists were not in 
7 Since Poland signalled that they would not make compromises, coalition partners started to engage in 
negotiations on two fronts: internally with Poland and externally with everyone else (interview 
Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-09). The Lithuanian delegation also flagged that they would not 
be willing to accept outcomes other than a Vodka-definition based on cereals and potatoes and, thus, 
also became isolated in the negotiations (interview Ministry of Agriculture#3, 03-04-09). Moreover the 
coalition was weakened because Finland was limited in their engagement for the group due to their 
Presidency: “it got very difficult also because it was Finland that had the presidency at the time and 
they were part of the alliance and they couldn’t go against it because they didn’t want to and they 
couldn’t support it either because they were the presidency” (interview Permanent Representation#54, 
18-03-09, similar interview Ministry of Agriculture#3, 03-04-09).
opposition to act in concert vis-à-vis third parties to promote or prevent a particular 
definition of Vodka (interviews interview EP#2, 02-04-09, Ministry of Agriculture#3, 
03-04-09). 
In line with the expectation, the UK-led coalition did not push for a common 
positive Vodka definition in the endgame of negotiations. The leading committee of 
the EP had proposed a compromise according to which Vodka should be made out of 
potatoes, cereals and sugarbeet molasses while other products should be labelled as 
‘Vodka out of’ (“Schnellhardt report”, c.f. paragraph on the EP). While this was a win 
set for the UK as well as the Nordic and Baltic countries, it was too broad for Poland 
and Lithuania as well as for France and the other Vodka producers in the UK-led 
coalitions using cane-sugar molasses, grapes or fruit. Hence, the anti-purists no longer 
acted in concert and lost influence in the course of the trialogues between the 
Commission, the EP and the Presidency that hammered out the final compromise. As 
a result, the outcome shifted towards a narrower definition of Vodka (all products not 
made of cereals and potatoes had to be labelled as ‘Vodka made of’). This was a win 
for the anti-purist coalition (which gained the concession that ‘non-traditional’ Vodka 
was listed on the same rank as ‘traditional’ Vodka and not treated differently 
(interview Ministry of Agriculture#3, 03-04-09)) so that the German presidency 
avoided a blocking minority, and brought, at the same time, as many of the new 
member states into the boat as possible (leaving only the uncompromising hardliners 
Poland and Lithuania aside). 
Contacts to the Commission (H4)   
All involved states wanted to influence the negotiations via the European Commission 
before the Commission’s proposal was officially out. 
Once the proposal was on the table, the UK and its allies argued that a narrow 
definition of Vodka—as exclusively distilled from potatoes and cereals—would 
violate WTO law since it would effectively prevent third countries from selling their 
products of Vodka (based on molasses, grapes or citrus fruit) on the European market 
(Mercer 2006a). The WTO argument of the UK flagged barriers to free trade and was 
also backed by South Africa in later stages of negotiations (interviews Permanent 
Representation#60, 30-03-09, Ministry for Agriculture#3, 03-04-09). It resonated well 
with the Commission’s orientation to avoid trade clashes, an orientation already 
outlined in initial proposal of the Commission (Commission of the European 
Communities 2005b, interview EP#2, 02-04-09, interview Permanent 
Representation#54, 18-03-09). Thus, it is not surprising that the European 
Commission voiced this argument themselves during the negotiations (interview 
Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-09 , Commission of the European Communities 
2007).
On the other side, mainly Sweden but also Poland contacted the Commission 
with the argument that consumer protection issues were at stake (interview Permanent 
Representation#54, 18-03-09, interview Ministry of Agriculture#2, 30-03-09). In 
particular they claimed that a broad Vodka definition was misleading, putting 
customers in a situation where they would not know whether the quality and taste 
expectations would be met if they bought a bottle with the Vodka-label on it. The 
Commission responded well, not the least because it has a long tradition of being 
concerned with the protection of consumers (interviews Permanent 
Representation#54, 18-03-09, European Parliament#2, 02-04-09). As a result, the 
Commission requested data on the expectations of consumers since only if consumers 
had clear expectations they would be protected (interviews Permanent 
Representation#60, 30-03-09, Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-09). The 
multiple-choice surveys were not standardized and not conducted in all member 
states, but only in a few such as the UK, France, Sweden, Poland, and the Baltics, and 
usually paid for by the respective Vodka-producing industry. Even though the results 
failed to be fully representative, they basically showed that expectations differ across 
countries (Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-09). Hence, the consumer protection 
argument, though initially resonating well with the Commission, became less 
compelling and lost importance in the subsequent discussions (e.g. interview Ministry 
of Agriculture#3, 03-04-09, Commission of the European Communities 2005a, 
Commission of the European Communities 2007).8
Another argument was advanced by Denmark: they emphasized that most of 
the Vodka-belt countries were new member states. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia did not use the accession negotiations to protect Vodka as a drink with 
geographical indications. Other states that joined after the 1973 Northern and before 
the 2004 Eastern enlargement got concessions that de facto protected parts of their 
8 This argument also did not resonate well with other member states “Let’s be clear, I don’t think it 
was a question of consumer expectation for any of those countries which were doing the survey, I think 
it was a question of protecting their industries.  In our case, we didn’t have an industry to protect so we 
did not need to go into that kind of logic.” (Permanent Representation #56, 19-03-09).
domestic markets (e.g. the Finnish concessions re very high salmonella standards that 
products such as chicken or egg have to meet before they can be sold in Finland). 
Denmark argued that “it would have been fair to them as a new member state, they 
don’t have that many rights and they are not protected in the proposal of spirits in that 
many senses.  It would have been fair to give it [a definition of Vodka that protects 
their interests and domestic industries, comment DP] to them.” (Permanent 
Representation#54, 18-03-09). However, the argument did not resonate well with the 
Commission (interview Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-09), not the last because 
Sweden and Finland already received concessions for other matters during their 
accession negotiations while Hungary, Cyprus and Bulgaria as new member states 
also produced non-potato or non-cereal based Vodka. In line with this, even the 
initiator of the fairness argument stated “if only it could have been a product with a 
certain flavour, then it would have made sense for the rest of us to say fair enough 
Poland this is a traditional thing you have been doing it forever, of course you have 
the right to sort of dictate to the rest of us how this product should be produced, but in 
the sense that it was it did not have a flavour and it was sort of saying you can 
produce it out of anything” (interview Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-09).
Despite the sensitivity to consumer protection issues and the initial sympathy of the 
Danish Commissioner, Mariann Fischer Boel, to the Vodka-purists concerns 
(interview organised interests#1, 02-04-09), the arguments of the UK on free-trade 
and the WTO resonated the strongest within the Commission and the DG Agriculture 
as a whole (e.g. interview European Parliament#2, 02-04-09). This is in line with the 
hypothesis.
Contacts to the EP (H5)
Even though the spirit drinks file was framed as an agricultural matter in the Council, 
it was decided under co-decision. Thus, the EP turned into a player with an equal 
weight than the Council. Three EP committees were involved: the Committee for 
Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on the Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection (IMCO), and the leading Committee on Environment, Public 
Health and food Safety (interviews Ministry of Agriculture#2, 30-03-09, European 
Parliament#2, 02-04-09). The advocates of a narrow and of a broad definition of 
Vodka approached the EP to lobby for their positions.
A very important committee was the one on agriculture. Here, Denmark acted as a 
broker. Although they had no Vodka-related self-interests, they supported the purists 
because of a diffuse reciprocity norm between Denmark and Sweden in this policy 
area (Permanent Representation #54, 18-03-09). Since Sweden did not have an MEP 
in the agricultural committee, Denmark activated its good contacts to the Danish 
MEP, Niels Busk, who happened to be the rapporteur of in the agricultural committee 
and “(..) lobbied parliament a lot, fed into them and told them to do this and that to 
see if it could fly (..)” (interview Permanent Representation #54, 18-03-09). Basically 
“all the arguments that were mentioned in the Council working groups were copied in 
parliament so it was WTO points came up and it was the fairness of treating a new 
member state, giving them something that other member states had gotten at the time 
when we had introduced the legislation” (interview Permanent Representation #54, 
18-03-09). At the beginning of the debate, the claim concerning tradition and quality 
was successful, and the committee proposed amendments of the Commission’s 
proposal exactly in line with a narrow Vodka-definition (European Parliament 
2006c).9 While the MEPs responded extremely well to the purists in March 2006, 
their influence declined a bit (European Parliament 2006a). In September 2006, none 
of five amendment proposals of the committee reflected the narrow Vodka-definition 
anymore but mainly opted for sugarbeet, molasses, potatoes and cereals or in two 
instances even for no specifications at all (European Parliament 2006b: 13-16). This 
shift was due to the fact that the arguments of the UK-led camp disseminated into the 
committee as well (interview Permanent Representation#61, 02-04-09). The claims 
that the UK Vodka-tradition was older than the ones in Sweden or Finland, that the 
regulation should not violate WTO law and that the labeling regulations was never 
designed to exclude established products from the market resonated well with many 
9 The March draft opinion entailed only the narrow Vodka definition (cereals and potatoes as raw 
materials only) and proposed to delete the Commission’s proposal of defining Vodka as “a spirit drink 
produced from ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin”. This was justified through “Vodka is traditionally 
produced from grain and/or potatoes, and it is therefore crucial that vodka should be given the same 
protection as other types of spirit such as rum or whisky, etc. The choice of raw materials is important 
for the organoleptic (taste) qualities of the drink and should therefore be restricted to grain and/or 
potatoes, thus making it unnecessary to place an extra burden on vodka producers by requiring them to 
specify the raw materials on the label. If the objective of such labelling is to give consumers 
information on the ingredients used for the production of the spirit drink, this should be done across the 
board  for all spirit drinks in accordance with the Labelling Directive, which already requires a list of 
ingredients for other foodstuffs.” (European Parliament 2006c: 10).
of the MEPs in the Committee.10 Although Denmark was sympathetic to purists-
arguments, they were neutral enough to accept the fact that MEPs in the Committee 
were divided. In the course of negotiations, the Danish rapporteur successfully 
fostered a compromise between both camps according to which “Vodka is a drink 
which is traditionally produced from grain, potatoes and/or sugarbeet molasses, and it 
is therefore very important that vodka should be accorded the same protection as other 
spirit drinks such as rum, whisky, etc.” (European Parliament 2006b: 16).11
The Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety was the 
leading committee in the EP. The rapporteur, Horst Schnellhardt, was German and the 
shadow-rapporteur, Linda McAvan, was from the UK. Hence, the UK had a strong 
advantage vis-à-vis the Vodka-belt countries in terms of access to and influence in the 
Committee. The UK used this window of opportunity to argue that the current Vodka 
products should not be excluded from the market and that the regulation should not 
create barriers to free trade. Instead, the UK argued for reasonable labelling that keeps 
customers informed of unusual contents and that the UK had an older Vodka-tradition 
than Finland and Sweden so that beet molasses was a traditional raw material as well 
(European Parliament 2006b: 13-14, interview European Parliament#2, 02-04-09). 
Poland’s influence on the committee was never as strong as the UK’s to begin with, 
but further declined over the course of negotiations: “The biggest defeat was 
Germany. At the starting position, they were supporting our position, but because of a 
difficult situation in Poland where we had that one guy become Minister of 
Agriculture, then he said he did not want to speak with Germany.” (interview 
organised interests#1, 02-04-09). While Poland did not exert influence via the 
environmental committee, Sweden, Finland and Denmark did disseminate ideas 
(interviews Permanent Representation#53, 18-03-09, Permanent Representation#58, 
19-03-09, Permanent Representation#59, 19-03-09). However, even though their 
MEPs had very good reputations as food safety experts, they were not successful in 
10 Accordingly, the justifications for broader Vodka-definitions stated: “To resolve the question of the 
raw materials from which vodka can be made this amendment ensures that these proposals are not a 
mechanism for the exclusion of legitimate products from the vodka market” (European Parliament 
2006b: 13).
11 He further argued that: “The choice of ingredients affects the organoleptic (taste) characteristics, and 
they must therefore be restricted to grain, potatoes and/or sugarbeet molasses, in conjunction with 
which it will also be unnecessary to compel vodka producers to accept an additional burden in the form 
of a requirement to indicate the ingredients on the label. If the aim of this requirement is to provide 
consumers with information about the ingredients used to produce a spirit drink, this should apply 
across the board to all spirit drinks in accordance with the labelling directive, which already requires 
lists of ingredients for other foodstuffs.” (European Parliament 2006b: 16).
launching convincing quality-related arguments because Vodka is a distilled product 
and does not consequently touch food safety (interview Ministry of Agriculture#2, 03-
04-09). However, the rapporteur of the committee for agriculture, the Dane, Niels 
Busk, gained influence in the environmental committee as well. Although the 
environmental committee had the lead, according to EP statutes the committees had to 
cooperate. In the course of this, the agriculture rapporteur presented the compromise 
formula (three traditional raw materials, not two) as developed during the committee-
internal negotiations. The appeal of this outcome to the rapporteur of the 
environmental committee, Horst Schnellhardt, was additionally strengthened by the 
Council’s legal service. Based on their reasoning, it is legally possible to differentiate 
between traditional and non-traditional Vodka, if and as long as the principle of 
proportionality is not violated (interview Ministry of Agriculture#2, 03-04-09). In 
effect, it is not unlawful to select some raw materials as traditional ones and label the 
product Vodka as long as non-traditional products would not be excluded from the 
market and could be sold under a different label (e.g. stating ‘Fruit-Vodka’ or ‘Vodka 
made out of’) (interview Ministry of Agriculture#2, 03-04-09). Against the 
background of these developments, the environmental rapporteur supported 
specifying the broad initial proposal from the European Commission to some extent 
and successfully advanced the compromise in their own committee. Thus, the final 
report of the environmental committee entailed a compromise according to which “the 
description, presentation or labelling of vodka not produced from potatoes, cereals or 
sugar beet molasses shall bear, in the same visual field as the sales denomination, the 
indication 'produced from...', supplemented by the raw material utilised to produce the
ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin” (European Parliament 2006d: 28).12
Also in response to its declining influence in the EP, Poland did not only use its direct 
contacts in some of the committees (interview Ministry of Agriculture#2, 30-03-09), 
but also organized Vodka tastings in the EP lobby to illustrate taste differences 
(interview Permanent Representation #59, 20 March 2009). However, these tastings 
12 This compromise formula was justified though “Vodka made from cereals, potatoes or sugar beet 
molasses may be described as a product produced by traditional methods. It should therefore bear the 
name vodka without any additional information. As the ethyl alcohol in vodka may also be produced 
from other agricultural products, it is necessary to indicate the agricultural products used in order to 
enable a clearer distinction to be made. Many special vodka varieties consist of ethyl alcohol from 
various agricultural products. In order to differentiate so-called traditionally-produced vodka, blends 
should be indicated.” (European Parliament 2006d: 28-29).
did not bring the success the Polish delegation wished for (interview European 
Parliament#2, 02-04-09). Even the representative of the Polish spirit drinks 
association conceded that taste differences due to the raw materials used are 
sometimes only recognizable by experts, but argued that this applies to other spirit 
drinks as well.13
In line with the EP-hypothesis, the UK was successful in exerting influence due to its 
strong links to the shadow rapporteur of the leading committee, which increased the 
resonance of its arguments in the EP considerably. Finland, Denmark and Sweden had 
all access to the environmental committee, but since the Vodka issue was not about 
food safety, their MEPs could not use their good reputation as food-safety experts to 
make compelling quality-related arguments. However, due to the responsiveness of 
the Danish rapporteur of the agricultural committee to the purists-arguments and the 
appeal of the British arguments to many other MEPs, the agriculture committee 
developed a compromise. Accordingly cereals, potatoes and sugarbeet molasses are 
considered raw materials for Vodka. This compromise was diffused into the lead 
environmental committee and became especially compelling since the Council legal 
service established that it was possible to distinguish between traditional and non-
traditional raw materials within limits of proportionality (e.g. not excluding products 
from the market, using labelling to differentiate between traditional and non-
traditional Vodka). In the end, the environmental rapporteur, Horst Schnellhardt, 
successfully passed the compromise that Vodka not made out of potatoes, cereals or 
sugar beet molasses has to be labelled as ‘Vodka made out of’. 
Influencing the Presidency (H6)
At different points of time, all states with interests at stake had been in contact with 
the respective Presidency. Yet, since Finland held this office during crucial stages of 
the negotiations, states on the purist’s side had no good chances to influence Finland 
via either arguing or bargaining. The office acts as a neutral mediator and Finland 
13 “What was quite interesting is that people can’t recognize whether it was molasses, whether it’s 
grape vodka or some other spirit. (..) We can’t recognize it, even there are some great brandies without 
sugar of the high rectification level, so quite pure, but the colour is the same as in whiskey because it 
contains caramel, but it is not sweet. It has a similar taste to whiskey, and many people are misleading 
by those products. There is rum based on molasses, but for example, Barcardi superior, sometimes is 
very difficult to recognize, even not for a real expert, there is a few that are real experts, but a customer 
from a blind testing could not tell the difference.” (organised interests#1, 02-04-09).
could not take sides in this highly politicized debate (interview Ministry of 
Agriculture#3, 03-04-09). “It got very difficult also because it was Finland that had 
the presidency at the time and they were part of the alliance and they couldn’t go 
against it because they didn’t want to and they couldn’t support it either because they 
were the presidency.” (Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-09). The UK and its 
coalition partners had no good chances to influence the Finish Presidency either, 
because their arguments in favour of a broad definition would not resonate well with 
Finish convictions about taste, quality, consumer protection or traditions and the 
necessity for a narrow definition (interview Permanent Representation#61, 02-04-09). 
The German presidency did not have self-interests concerning Vodka and was 
slightly more sensitive to arguments from the Vodka-belt countries (Permanent 
Representation#60, 30-03-09, Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-09). Sweden in 
particular approached the Presidency with general support-offers in exchange for an 
understanding of the Swedish sensitivities and was relatively successful in the end 
(interview Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-09). Yet, since the UK-led coalition 
had a blocking minority, the German presidency was also responsive to them and did 
not support a position according to which Vodka can exclusively be made of potatoes 
and cereals (Permanent Representation#61, 02-04-09). As a result, the German 
presidency strongly supported the compromise that became more and more apparent 
in EP deliberations and the trialogue meetings with the EP and the Commission. 
Namely, that Vodka from raw materials other than cereals and potatoes has to be 
labelled as “Vodka made out of ..” instead of simply “Vodka” (interview Ministry of 
Agriculture#3, 03-04-09). 
“It was surreal that you had been negotiating something for such a long time 
and member states really disagreed and in the end you just have the compromise and 
the Presidency had enough courage to say this is the compromise we will take a vote.” 
(Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-09).
Hence, as expected by the Presidency-hypothesis, Sweden, Denmark and the other 
purist-countries had little success in influencing the Finish presidency due to the 
neutrality norm, while the UK was not very successful due to the low resonance of 
their arguments with Finish convictions. The German presidency was eager to close 
the file and, thus, supported a compromise that accommodated the purist’s interests to 
some extent and, at the same time, avoided a negative vote of the UK and its allies. 
IV. Conclusions
How can small states shape European policies according to their interests despite 
fewer votes, fewer MEPs, slimmer administrations in their respective ministries, and 
smaller delegations in Brussels? This paper developed a set of hypotheses explicating 
the scope conditions under which argumentative, bargaining-based and several 
compound strategies should be effective. Although the success of bargaining and 
coalitions is influenced by the size of the actors, the success of the other negotiation 
strategies, such as arguing and contacting the Commission, the Presidency or the EP 
depends to a large extent on the resonance of arguments. In accordance with this, the 
highly contentious negotiations of the EU spirit drinks regulation illustrated that small 
states can use the same array of strategies as their bigger counterparts and can shape 
outcomes if the scope conditions are met. 
Arguments are only successful, if they resonate well with prior believes of the 
addressees (H1). Yet, the Vodka case showed that more often than not, arguments 
failed to convince neutral addressees. Not even countries with a reputation of having 
good and scientifically up-to-date arguments and as being food safety forerunners, 
such as Denmark, was able to argue successfully in the Council. This is not surprising 
because the Vodka case was not about scientific expertise, but a political question.14
In line with the bargaining hypothesis (H2), threats did not induce position shifts in 
the Council either. While states had a common idea of what constituted bargaining 
power and mostly believed that the Polish or Lithuanian ‘no-votes’ or a UK/South 
African-triggered WTO litigation were realistic scenarios, neutral states did not fear 
interferences with their own interests and action-plans and did not react with 
concessions. As expected, coalitions can be effective support tools in approaching the 
Commission, the Presidency or the EP if the internal coherence and the collective 
leverage are high (H3a,b). The UK-led coalition casted a shadow of a blocking 
minority over the negotiations and thereby ruled out a very narrow definition in the 
end-game (interview EP#2, 02-04-09, interview Permanent Representation#61, 02-04-
09). At the same time, the purist-coalition was too weak to form a blocking minority 
14 “There is no science in this.  This is not science at all.  This is a matter of whether you would give 
something to the vodka-producing countries, if you would give them a protection.  Just like you could 
say there is no science behind the fact that you produce champagne in northern France and you produce 
cava in Spain or whatever you do.  There is no science in this whatsoever.  This is purely a political 
question” (interview Permanent Representation#54, 18-03-09).
and additionally suffered from internal heterogeneity concerning a minimally 
acceptable outcome. Contacts to the Commission were important (H4). In particular 
the UK made arguments that resonated well with the liberal market orientation of the 
Commission and gained influence as expected. The Swedish consumer protection 
argument resonated well at the beginning. But since the Commission requested data 
on consumer expectation, which thEn showed mixed results, the argument became 
less compelling and lost influence. Finally, the EP was a very important battleground. 
As expected, states with direct contacts to the rapporteur or shadow rapporteur of an 
involved committee had good chances to disseminate their ideas (H5). Denmark was 
very successful in working through the agriculture committee, as was the UK in 
working through the environmental committee. Both induced a compromise formula 
that then became the basis for the final negotiation outcome. Lobbying the presidency 
had limited success for big and small states from both camps while Finland had the 
office since they remained neutral (H6). Once Germany took over, nearly all states 
did seek influence. Germany responded to some of the purists’ arguments, most 
notably tradition and fairness. But since the German presidency was at the same time 
aware of the blocking minority of the non-purist coalition, they opted for a 
compromise. Thus, all Vodka made not out of potatoes or cereals has to be labeled 
accordingly, while, at the same time, the non-traditional Vodka was not regarded as of 
lesser quality than the traditional Vodka and listed under the same number in the 
regulation instead of further down (interview Ministry of Agriculture#3, 03-04-09). 
Thus, although Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia all have 
fewer votes, fewer MEPs, slimmer administrations in the respective ministries, and 
smaller delegations in Brussels than the UK or Poland, they can be influential actors 
in issues of great importance. The Vodka case illustrated that small states can use the 
same array of strategies as their bigger counterparts. Although the success of 
bargaining and coalitions is influenced by the size of the actors, the success of other 
negotiation strategies, such as arguing and contacting the Commission, the Presidency 
or the EP does not depend on size but to a large extent on the resonance of arguments 
or conceptions of power and threats.
The Vodka case also showed that small states can sometimes punch above 
their weight and gain more than one might expect based on their political or economic 
weight in the EU. While size matters for the effectiveness of some policy-shaping 
strategies (e.g. bargaining and coalitions), it is no scope condition for the success of 
arguing vis-à-vis the Council, the European Parliament, or the Commission. Hence, 
small states that redirect their limited resources to files of high priority can be very 
active in negotiations. This is especially crucial when bigger coalition partners are 
absent or not helpful. The Vodka case is an instance in which the smaller Nordic and 
Baltic states could not piggyback on a bigger coalition partner. Poland was a member 
of the purist-coalition, but due to its uncompromising and hard-bargaining behaviour, 
it became isolated and was no great help or at worst even did more harm than good in 
the negotiations (interviews Permanent Representation#60, 30-03-09, Permanent 
Representation#54, 18-03-09, EP#2, 02-04-09). Against the background that Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark, Estonia and Latvia faced, the UK and its coalition partners 
achieved a remarkable success in pushing the negotiation outcome from the very 
broad Commission’s proposal (raw materials of agricultural origins) to the relatively 
narrow outcome (raw materials: cereals and potatoes, other materials require the label 
‘Vodka made of’) (interview Permanent Represnetation#42, 12-01-09). This success 
cannot be attributed to one grand strategy of one small state, but to the concert of 
different activities. Sweden and Denmark especially and to a lesser extent the Baltic 
states were very active and argued in the Council, fostered coalitions, worked with the 
EP, and contacted the Presidencies and the European Commission. Some of those 
endeavours failed to induce favourable position shifts of the addressees (e.g. arguing 
in the Council). Others were effective, such as the arguing-based efforts of Sweden 
and Denmark vis-à-vis a large array of addressees and in multiple arenas. In particular 
Denmark’s contact to the EP agricultural committee and the Nordic states’ contacts to 
the German presidency were significant for the negotiation outcome. 
Since states cannot trust that a single successful strategy alone will influence 
policy outcomes (e.g., because an argument in the Council – even if it persuades all 
other member states – does not in itself impact the EP or the Commission) small and 
big states apply several strategies during negotiation processes. Hence, EU 
negotiations are mixed-manoeuvre games in the same and across multiple arenas. In 
order to achieve favourable outcomes big and small states with important interests at 
stake use as many strategies as necessary (vis-à-vis the same or different actors) to 
either ensure a minimal winning coalition or a blocking minority in all relevant 
negotiation arenas (Council and Parliament, eventually also the Commission). In this 
sense, individual successes and failures of strategies add up to the overall negotiation 
performance of a state,15 which, in turn, is closely linked to the chances of shaping a 
policy. 
Big states have power-based advantages in the Council, vis-à-vis the 
Presidency and the Commission. They have more MEPs in the EP and, thus, a greater 
chance to diffuse ideas into the involved committees. And big states possess more 
administrative resources and more staff in the ministries back home and the 
Permanent Representations to develop sound positions backed up by arguments or 
threats. Thus, they are structurally in a better position to shape policies via bargaining 
or arguing than small states. But small states can concentrate their limited resources 
on issues of great importance, such as Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Baltic states 
in the Vodka case. This allows small states to be equally active than big states and 
allow them to apply different policy-shaping strategies. Since the effectiveness of 
argument-based shaping strategies is not dependent on the size of the acting country, 
but the resonance of ideas, small states can punch above their weight. The Vodka case 
is an instance in which small states succeeded. Small states prevented an outcome 
resembling the Commission’s initial very broad Vodka-definition although the 
collective bargaining power of the purists was far less than the bargaining leverage of 
the proponents of a broad definition. 
15 Negotiation performance equals the number of actors that changed positions in a favourable manner 
minus the number of actors that did not change their positions in a favourable manner.
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